A INSINCERIDADE NA JURISDIÇÃO CONSTITUCIONAL

Gabriel Accioly Gonçalves

Resumo


THE INSINCERITY IN CONSTITUTIONAL ADJUDICATION

RESUMO: O artigo tem por finalidade analisar o valor da sinceridade judicial (judicial candor) e suas repercussões na jurisdição constitucional. São abordados, criticamente: i) os aspectos conceituais do tema; ii) as linhas doutrinárias de objeção e defesa à adoção desse dever; iii) a sinceridade em órgãos decisórios colegiados. Uma vez coletadas as conclusões parciais dessas investigações, argumenta-se, à luz destas, que o resultado e a fundamentação das decisões da jurisdição constitucional devem ser sinceros, devendo o julgador, ainda, ser honesto quanto ao fato da criação judicial do direito.

PALAVRAS-CHAVE: sinceridade judicial; jurisdição constitucional; criação judicial do direito.

ABSTRACT: The article aims at analyzing the value of judicial candor and it’s repercussions in constitutional adjudication. It is critically assessed: i) conceptual aspects of the theme; ii) the academics point of view for and against the adoption of this duty; iii) sincerity in collegial decisional entities. Once collected the partial conclusions of these investigations, it is argued, in light of those, that the final decision and motivation in constitutional adjudication must be sincere, having the judge, also, the duty of being honest about the fact of judicial lawmaking.

KEYWORDS: judicial candor; constitutional adjudication; judge-made law.

SUMÁRIO: Introdução; 1 Aspectos conceituais; 2 Objeções ao dever de sinceridade judicial; 3 As teses favoráveis ao judicial candor; 4 Sinceridade em órgãos colegiados; 5 Um mau exemplo: legislador negativo e a insinceridade de discursos de negação da criatividade na jurisdição constitucional; Palavras finais; Referências.

SUMMARY: Introduction; 1 Conceptual aspects; 2 Objections to the duty of judicial candor; 3 The favorable arguments on judicial candor; 4 Sincerity in collegial entities; 5 A bad example: negative legislator and the insincerity of judicial lawmaking denial in constitutional adjudication; Final remarks; References.


Texto completo:

PDF

Referências


ACKERMAN, Bruce. The Failure of the Founding Fathers: Jefferson, Marshall, and the Rise of Presidential Democracy. Cambridge: Belknap, 2007.

ALEXY, Robert. Constitucionalismo discursivo. Porto Alegre: Livraria do Advogado, 2008.

ALTMAN, Scott. Beyond Candor. Michigan Law Review, v. 89, n. 2, p. 296-351, 1991.

BALKIN, Jack. Living Originalism. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2011.

______. The New Originalism and the Uses of History. Fordham Law Review, v. 82, n. 1, p. 641-719, 2013.

BARROSO, Luís Roberto. A razão sem voto: o Supremo Tribunal Federal e o governo da maioria. Revista Brasileira de Políticas Públicas, v. 5, n. 2, p. 24-50, 2015.

BAUM, Lawrence. Judges and their audiences: a perspective on judicial behaviour. Nova Jersey: Princeton University, 2006.

BENTHAM, Jeremy. The works of Jeremy Bentham – Under the Superintendence of his Executor, John Bowring (part I). Londres: Simpkin, Marshall & Co, 1838.

BOK, Sissela. Lies for the Public Good. In: MENKEL, Carrie; WHEELER, Michael (Coord.). What’s Fair – Ethics for Negotiators. São Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 2004. p. 371-82.

BRANDÃO, Rodrigo. Suprema judicial versus diálogos constitucionais: quem tem a última palavra na interpretação da Constituição? Rio de Janeiro: Lumen Juris, 2013.

BRASIL. STF, ADI 3330, Rel. Min. Ayres Britto, DJ 22.03.2013.

______. STF, ADI 3510, Rel. Min. Ayres Britto, DJ 28.05.2010.

______. STF, ADI 4277, Rel. Min. Ayres Britto, DJ 13.10.2011.

______. STF, ADO 22, Relª Min. Cármen Lúcia, DJ 03.08.2015.

______. STF, ADPF 132, Rel. Min. Ayres Britto, DJ 14.10.2011.

______. STF, ARE 710026-ED, Rel. Min. Luiz Fux, DJ 23.04.2015.

CALABRESI, Guido. A Common Law for the Age of Statutes. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1982.

CALABRESI, Steven G. Text vs. Precedent in Constitutional Law. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, v. 31, n. 3, p. 947-959, 2008.

CAMINKER, Evan H. Sincere and Strategic Voting on Multimember Courts. Michigan Law Review, v. 97, n. 8, p. 2297-2380, 1999.

CHEMERINSKY, Erwin. Seeing through the emperor’s clothes: recognizing the reality of constitutional decision making. Boston University Law Review, v. 86, n. 5, p. 1069-1082, 2006.

DWORKIN, Ronald. Taking Rights Seriously. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1978.

______. Introduction. In: DWORKIN, Ronald (Coord.). A badly flawed election. Nova York: The New Press, 2002.

ESTADOS UNIDOS DA AMÉRICA. Suprema Corte, Osborn v. Bank of U.S., 22 U.S. 738, 1824.

FALLON, Richard H. The Supreme Court 1996 Term. Foreword: Implementing the Constitution. Harvard Law Review, v. 111, n. 1, p. 54-152, 1997.

FLEMING, James. Fidelity to our imperfect constitution: for moral readings and against originalisms. Oxford: Oxford University, 2015.

FORRESTER, Ray. Truth in Judging: Supreme Court Opinions as Legislative Drafting. Vanderbilt Law Review, v. 38, n. 3, p. 463-477, 1985.

FRIEDMAN, Barry. The politics of judicial review. Texas Law Review, v. 84, p. 257-337, 2005.

FULLER, Lon. Legal Fictions. Stanford: Stanford University, 1970.

GINSBURG, Ruth Bader. Remarks on Writing Separately. Washington Law Review, v. 65, n. 1, p. 133-150, 1990.

______. The Role of Dissenting Opinions. Minnesota Law Review, v. 95, n. 1, p. 1-8, 2010.

HIRSCH, Alan. Candor and Prudence in Constitutional Adjudication. George Washington Law Review, v. 61, n. 3, p. 858-870, 1993.

IDLEMAN, Scott. A Prudential Theory of Judicial Candor. Texas Law Review, v. 73, n. 2, p. 1307-1417, 1995.

LEFLAR, Robert A. Honest Judicial Opinions. Northwestern University Law Review, v. 74, n. 5, p. 721-741, 1979.

KAHAN, Dan. Neutral Principles, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law. Harvard Law Review, v. 125, n. 1, p. 1-77, 2010.

KELSEN, Hans. Teoria pura do direito. São Paulo: Martins Fontes, 1997.

KITROSSER, Heidi. Interpretive Modesty. Minnesota Legal Studies Research Paper, n. 14-34, p. 1-43, 2014.

KORNHAUSER, Lewis A.; SAGER, Lawrence G. The One and the Many: Adjudication in Collegial Courts. California Law Review, v. 81, n. 1, p. 1-60, 1993.

MAINE, Henry Sunmer. Ancient Law – It’s connection to the History of Early Society. Reino Unido: Read Books, 2007.

MILLER, Arthur Selwyn; SASTRI, D. S. Secrecy and the Supreme Court: On the Need for Piercing the Red Velour Curtain. Buffalo Law Review, v. 22, n. 3, p. 799-824, 1973.

MULLER, John F. The Constitutional Incompleteness Theorem. Journal of Constitutional Law, v. 15, n. 5, p. 1373-1454, 2013.

PANZERA, Claudio. Interpretare, Manipolare, Combinare. Una nuova prospettiva per lo studio delle decisioni della Corte costituzionale. Roma: Edizioni Scientifiche Italiane, 2013.

PEREIRA, Jane Reis Gonçalves. Representação democrática do Judiciário: reflexões preliminares sobre os riscos e dilemas de uma ideia em ascensão. Revista Juris Poiesis, n. 17, p. 343-359, 2014.

POGREBINSCHI, Thamy. Judicialização ou representação: política, direito e democracia no Brasil. Rio de Janeiro: Elsevier, 2011.

POSNER, Richard. The Federal Courts. Cambridge: Harvard University, 1999.

______. Foreword: A Political Court. Harvard Law Review, v. 119, n. 1, p. 32-102, 2005.

POST, Robert; SIEGEL, Reva. Originalism as a Political Practice: The Right’s Living Constitution. Fordham Law Review, v. 75, n. 2, p. 545-574, 2006.

RAWLS, John. Political Liberalism. Nova York: Columbia University, 1996.

SANCHÍS, Luis Prieto. Interpretación Jurídica y Creación Judicial del Derecho. Lima: Temis, 2007.

SCALIA, Antonin. Common-law Courts in a Civil-law System. In: GUTMANN, Amy (Coord.). A Matter of interpretation. Nova Jersey: Princeton University, 1997. p. 3-47.

SCHAUER, Frederick. Thinking Like a Lawyer – A New Introduction to Legal Reasoning. Cambridge: Harvard University, 2009.

SCHWARTZMAN, Micah. The Principle of Judicial Sincerity. Virginia Law Review, v. 94, n. 4, p. 987-1028, 2008.

SEGAL, Jeffrey; SPAETH, Harold. The Supreme Court and the Attitudinal model revisited. Cambridge: Cambridge University, 2002.

SHAPIRO, David L. In defense of judicial candor. Harvard Law Review, v. 100, p. 731-750, 1987.

SHAPIRO, Martin. Judges as liars. Harvard Journal of Law & Public Policy, v. 17, p. 155-156, 1994.

SMITH, Peter J. New legal fictions. Georgetown Law Journal, v. 95, n. 5, p. 1435-1496, 2007.

SOLUM, Lawrence. The Interpretation-Construction Distinction. Constitutional Commentary, v. 27, n. 1, p. 95-118, 2010.

STAUDT, Nancy; FRIEDMAN, Barry; EPSTEIN, Lee. On the role of ideological homogeneity in generating consequential constitutional decisions. University of Pennsylvania Journal of Constitutional Law, v. 10, n. 2, p. 361-386, 2008.

SULLIVAN, Kathleen M. The Candor of Justice Marshall. Harvard Blackletter Law Journal, v. 6, p. 83-9, 1989.

______. Incompletely Theorized Agreements in Constitutional Law. Social Research, v. 74, n. 1, p. 1-24, 2007.

SWEET, Alec Stone. Governing with judges. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.

TAYLOR, Hannis. Legitimate functions of judge-made law. The Green Bag, v. XVII, n. 10, p. 557-565, 1905.

WEDEKING, Justin; FARGANIS, Dion. The candor factor: does nominee evasiveness affect judiciary committee support for supreme court nominees? Hofstra Law Review, v. 39, n. 2, p. 329-368, 2011.


Apontamentos

  • Não há apontamentos.


Direitos autorais 2016 Gabriel Accioly Gonçalves